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Abstract
In this paper we provide a model of Research Joint Venture (RJV), and study the incentives
of competing ﬁrms to cooperate in product development. Firms that participate in the RJV
decide on the product components for joint development, i.e., they decide on how much to
cooperate. We consider three cases: (i) an RJV with an exogenous size and an endogenous
scope, (ii) an RJV with an endogenous size and an exogenous scope, and (iii) an RJV with an
endogenous size and scope. Using numerical simulations we show that, on average, there is a
negative relationship between the size and the scope of the RJV in both cases (i) and (ii). In
case (iii), we ﬁnd a positive relationship between the equilibrium size and the equilibrium scope
of the RJV. Furthermore, both the equilibrium size and scope of the RJV are increasing with
the industry size.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
In many industries, especially in the automobile sector, rival ﬁrms team up to develop product
components which are then used to manufacture competing ﬁnal-products. Cooperation among
these ﬁrms is not "full" in the sense that ﬁrms do not develop an entire product jointly, but
only some components of it.1 For example, it is common for automakers to team up to develop
product components such as hybrid systems, fuel-cell systems, transmissions systems, or break
systems.2 While ﬁrms cooperate in developing particular product components, each ﬁrm pursues
its independent R&D for other product components that are necessary to develop the end-product.
In such cases—unlike the standard treatment of the theoretical literature—ﬁrms do not make zero-one
decisions on cooperation in product development. Instead, ﬁrms decide on the product components
that they wish to develop jointly, that is, on the degree of cooperation in product development.3
In this paper, we consider an oligopolistic market and study the degree of cooperation in product
development that might emerge among competing ﬁrms.4 Firms that participate in the Research
Joint Venture5 (RJV) decide on product components for joint development. We assume that a
higher degree of cooperation (i.e., a larger number of product components developed jointly) leads
to a lower degree of product diﬀerentiation, as it will imply a larger number of common product
components in participant ﬁrms’ end-products. Therefore, we consider intensiﬁed competition in
the product market as a major cost of forming cooperative alliances in product development.6
Such a cost may be signiﬁcant, particularly in markets where product diﬀerentiation matters for
end consumers, and might partly explain why cooperation among rivals does not always emerge.7
We consider three cases: (i) an RJV with an exogenous size and an endogenous scope; (ii) an
RJV with an endogenous size and an exogenous scope; and (iii) an RJV with an endogenous size
and scope. Using numerical simulations we show that, on average, there is a negative relationship
1One exception is production of "twin automobiles." See Lado et al. (2004) for examples of identical cars that are
sold under diﬀerent brand names.
2For example, Suzuki and GM have teamed up for the development of a hybrid system as well as fuel-cell systems.
The collaboration will end by February 2010. See Wall Street Journal, "Suzuki to End Hybrid Work With GM,"
January 15, 2010.
3We also refer the degree of cooperations as the "scope" of the cooperative agreement.
4See Bourreau and Do˘ gan (2010), who study "partial" cooperation, along with full cooperation, between two
competing ﬁrms.
5In this paper we use RJV as a broader term that includes any type of cooperative alliances aimed at joint product
development. We do not consider RJVs that aim at cost reduction.
6The way we model cost of cooperation is similar to Lambertini et al. (2002), but our setting diﬀers in that the
cost of cooperation varies with the degree of cooperation.
7See also Röller et al. (2007), who show that "asymmetries" among the ﬁrms (in marginal cost) may lead to a
disincentive to form an RJV.
2b e t w e e nt h es i z ea n dt h es c o p eo ft h eR J Vi nb o t hc a s e s( i )a n d( i i ) .I nc a s e( i i i ) ,w eﬁnd a positive
relationship between the equilibrium size and the equilibrium scope of the RJV. Furthermore, both
the equilibrium size and scope of the RJV are increasing with the industry size.
These results hinge on four diﬀerent eﬀects. First, there is a development cost eﬀect, which
introduces a complementarity between the size and the scope of the RJV. A higher number of
member ﬁrms implies larger savings from development costs, which gives member ﬁrms incentives
to set a larger scope for the RJV. Similarly, an RJV with a larger scope gives incentives to involve
a larger number of ﬁrms. Second, a larger number of participants in the RJV has a negative direct
eﬀect on the proﬁto fm e m b e rﬁrms, as it shifts their demand inwards due to a lower degree of
diﬀerentiation. Third, a larger number of member ﬁrms has also a positive indirect eﬀect on the
proﬁto fm e m b e rﬁrms; this is because, as the demand for RJV members shifts inward, each member
ﬁrm reduces its output, which impacts positively the other ﬁrms’ proﬁts. The magnitude of the
direct and indirect eﬀects, hence, the total eﬀect of increasing the size of the RJV, depends on the
scope of the RJV (i.e., on the degree of cooperation). Fourth, there is a sensitivity-of-proﬁts eﬀect;
a st h es i z eo ft h eR J Vi n c r e a s e s ,m e m b e rﬁrms’ proﬁts become less sensitive to diﬀerentiation for
low degrees of diﬀerentiation and more sensitive for high degrees of diﬀerentiation. Therefore, when
t h ed e g r e eo fd i ﬀerentiation is low (resp., high) and the size of the RJV increases, member ﬁrms
have an incentive to choose a larger (resp., smaller) scope for the RJV.
Our paper is related to the theoretical literature on cooperative R&D and formation of RJVs.
The existing literature addresses a large set of interesting questions, ranging from how private and
social incentives for cooperation compare in diﬀerent settings (e.g., in the presence of uncertainty,
synergies, endogenous as well as exogenous spillovers, and with and without an innovation race)8 to
how cooperation may aﬀect incentives to maintain post-innovation collusion.9 The main features
that diﬀerentiate our model from those studied in the existing literature are as follows:
1. an RJV is formed for cooperation in product development;
2. an RJV can be formed by a subset of ﬁrms that compete in the oligopolistic industry;
3. participating ﬁrms decide on the degree of cooperation (i.e., on the scope of RJV); and
4. a high degree of cooperation intensiﬁes post-R&D competition among RJV members.
8Among others, see Suzumura (1992), Choi (1993), Kamien et al (1992), and Kamien and Zang (2000).
9See Martin (1996), Cabral (2000), and Lambertini et al (2002).
3First, with very few exceptions, the literature focuses on process R&D (i.e., R&D eﬀorts for
cost reduction) rather than product development. Notable exceptions are Motta (1992) and Lin
and Saggi (2002) both of which consider a duopoly setting with a binary choice for cooperation.
Second, among those studies that consider an oligopolistic setting with process R&D, the major-
ity consider an industry-wide RJV.10 Papers that consider a subset of the ﬁrms in the industry are
Katz (1986), Poyago-Theotoky (1995), and Falvey et al. (2006). Katz (1986) analyzes cooperation
for process innovation with spillovers, where the number of participants of the RJV can range from
t w ot ot h et o t a ln u m b e ro fﬁrms in the industry. Poyago-Theotoky (1995) analyzes the optimal
size of a research joint venture, in an oligopolistic setting with homogeneous goods, process R&D
and spillovers. Falvey et al. (2006) adopt a similar setting, and study the impact of coordination
costs on the equilibrium size of the RJV.
Third, the majority of papers consider cooperation decisions as binary: ﬁrms either cooperate
or they don’t. Two exceptions are Goyal et al. (2008) and Bourreau and Do˘ gan (2010). Goyal et
al. (2005) study the relationship between R&D investments in joint projects and in-house projects.
Bourreau and Do˘ gan (2010) use a setting similar to that in this paper, and study the interaction
between cooperation in product and process R&D in a duopolistic setting.
Finally, with very few exceptions (notably Vilasuso and Frascatore (2000), Lambertini et al.
(2002), and Falvey et al. (2006)) the literature does not consider any economic cost of cooperation;11
it concludes that cooperation is, at least in a weak sense, desirable for ﬁrms since they can always
replicate the non-cooperative equilibrium.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we set up our oligopoly
model of RJV in product development. We study the three diﬀerent cases stated above in separate
sections: in Section 3 to 5. In Section 6 we discuss social welfare in the three diﬀerent cases. Finally,
we conclude.
10See, for example, Motta (1992), Suzumura (1992), Yi (1995), and Kamien et al. (1992). Suzumura (1992) extends
the model of d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) to oligopolies. Kamien et al. (1992) analyze n-ﬁrm oligopolies and
compare four scenarios of R&D activity in terms of social welfare.
11Vilasuso and Frascatore (2000) consider an exogenous ﬁxed cost of forming an RJV, which can be attributed to
its management or auditing. In Lambertini et al. (2002), when ﬁrms cooperate in product innovation they develop
a single product, whereas they produce diﬀerentiated products when they do not cooperate. Therefore, cooperative
R&D comes with a cost; it leads to ﬁerce competition post-innovation unless ﬁrms collude at the competition stage.
Falvey et al. (2006) introduce coordination costs to run an RJV in an oligopolistic setting. The coordination costs
are modeled through the marginal cost of process R&D; the authors assume that the marginal cost of process R&D
increases with the number of participants in the RJV. Coordination costs tend to decrease the R&D of members of
the RJV, as well as reduce the equilibrium size of the RJV.
42 A model of RJV for product development
Consider an oligopoly with  ex-ante identical ﬁrms, where the ﬁnal product is composed of a
continuum of product components normalized to 1. We study an RJV formed by  ﬁrms, with
2 ≤  ≤ , for joint development of product components. Without loss of generality, we order the
ﬁrms so that ﬁrms  =1 are the RJV members and ﬁrms  =  +1are the non-member
ﬁrms.
While ( − ) ﬁrms develop their entire ﬁnal products individually, RJV members cooperatively
decide on the product components that they develop jointly (i.e., on the degree of commonality12
in their products), ,w i t h ∈ [01]. We assume that the set of jointly developed components is
[0],t h a ti s ,t h eﬁrms cooperate to develop the ﬁrst  components. The degree of commonality, ,
represents the degree of cooperation in product development;  =0corresponds to the degenerate
case in which there is no cooperation within the RJV, whereas  =1corresponds to the case in
which the RJV members develop the entire ﬁnal product jointly.
The degree of cooperation in product development determines both the product development
costs and the degree of product diﬀerentiation.
Product development costs The ﬁrms have the same cost of developing product components.
The marginal development cost of the  component is denoted by (),a n d(·) is continuous.
Letting () denote the total cost of developing the ﬁrst  product components, we have
()=
Z 
0
()
RJV members share the development cost of common components, (),e q u a l l y . E a c hﬁrm
also carries in-house R&D to develop the remaining product components, for which the ﬁrm bares
the full cost of development. Let () denote the total development cost for a member of the
RJV, for a given degree of cooperation of .W eh a v e
 ()=
()

+( (1) − ()),
12We use the degree of cooperation, the degree of commonality, and scope of the RJV interchangeably throughout
the paper.
5which can be rewritten as
 ()=(1) −
 − 1

().( 1 )
The ﬁrst term in (1) represents the cost of developing the entire product alone, and the second
term represents the economies from cooperation in product development that is enjoyed by the
RJV members. The total development cost decreases with the degree of cooperation, ,a n dw i t h
t h es i z eo ft h eR J V ,.13 The development cost for non-member ﬁrms is − = (1).
In this setting, the mere beneﬁt of cooperation in product development is due to cost sharing,
and there are no synergies from joint product development. Furthermore, we have ((1) − ())+
()=(1), and hence, there are no economies (or diseconomies) of scope in developing the
product components.
Degree of product diﬀerentiation We model the degree of product diﬀerentiation between
the product of ﬁrm  and the product of ﬁrm , so that it depends on the "distance" between the
products of these two ﬁrms. Assume that component  of ﬁrm ’s product takes value  ()=
if it is developed in-house, and value  ()=0if it is developed jointly with the other ﬁrms. Also,
let  be the measure of the set of jointly developed components, { ∈ [01]| ()=0}. Then, we
have  = ,w h e r e represents the degree of commonality between the ﬁrms’ products. Finally,
let ∆ =1− .I tc a nb ev e r i ﬁed that ∆ represents a distance between the products of ﬁrm  and
ﬁrm .14
T h ed e g r e eo fd i ﬀerentiation between the ﬁrms’ products, , is then determined by the degree
of commonality, . We assume that diﬀerentiation is at a minimum when the distance between
the products is nil, (i.e., (1) = min) and at a maximum when the distance is equal to 1, (i.e.,
(0) = max). We assume that the degree of diﬀerentiation between members of the RJV, denoted by
, is decreasing with ,t h a ti s , = () and ()  0,w i t h ∈ [min max], min ∈ [0 max)
and max  1.15 Since a non-member ﬁrm (i.e., outside the RJV) does not share any common
component with the other ﬁrms, the distance between its product and any other ﬁrm’s product is
equal to 1, and hence, the degree of diﬀerentiation between this ﬁrm and any other ﬁrm is equal
13Indeed, we have  () ≥  () for all  ≤ .
14This is true as we have (i) ∆ ≥ 0,( i i )∆ =0if and only if the products of ﬁrms  and  are identical (i.e.,  =1 ),
and (iii) ∆()+∆() ≥ ∆() is always true.
15We assume that min ≥ 0, that is, even when all product components are developed jointly by the RJV ﬁrms
( =1 ), their end-products are not necessarily perceived as perfect substitutes by the consumers. See, for example,
Sullivan (1998) and Lado et al. (2004) on how brand names aﬀect the demand for "twin automobiles." Twin
automobiles are identical products that are sold under diﬀerent brand names (e.g., Citroen Evasion, Fiat Ulysses,
and Peugeot 806), for which the consumers’ willingness to pay is not necessarily the same.
6to max.
Demand We generalize the demand system provided by Dixit (1979) and Singh and Vives (1984).
The utility of the representative consumer is given by
 (q)=
 X
=1
 −
1
2
 X
=1
()
2 −
−1 X
=1

 X
=+1
(1 − ) + ,( 2 )
where  is the degree of diﬀerentiation between the product of ﬁrm  and the product of ﬁrm ,
q = (1 ) is the vector of quantities, and  is the numeraire good. Then, the inverse demand
for an RJV member ﬁrm  =1is
 =  −  −
 X
=1
6=
(1 − ) −
 X
=+1
(1 − max)
where  and  denote the quantity and price of ﬁrm  and  the quantity of ﬁrm . The inverse
demand for a non-member ﬁrm  =  +1  is
 =  −  −
 X
=1
6=
(1 − max)
Finally, once the products are developed, ﬁrms produce at a constant marginal cost of  and
compete in the product market with quantities. The net (resp., gross) proﬁto fa nR J Vm e m b e r
ﬁrm is denoted by Π (resp., ), and the net (resp., gross) proﬁt of a non-member ﬁrm is denoted
by Π− (resp., −). The net proﬁts for RJV member ﬁrms and non-member ﬁrms are
Π ()=(()) − ()
and
Π− ()=− (()) − (1)
respectively. We assume that the market is viable; in equilibrium Π ()Π− () ≥ 0 for any
 and .
We consider three cases: (i) an RJV with an exogenous size and an endogenous degree of
cooperation (scope); (ii) an RJV with an endogenous size and an exogenous degree of cooperation
(scope); and (iii) an RJV with an endogenous size and an endogenous degree of cooperation (scope).
73 An RJV with an exogenous size and an endogenous scope
In this subsection we consider an RJV with an exogenous size, , and study the equilibrium degree
of cooperation. The equilibrium gross proﬁts of both member and non-member ﬁrms, ∗

¡

¢
and ∗
−
¡

¢
, are decreasing with the industry size, .16 If  =0 ,t h e nR J Vm e m b e rﬁrms and
non-member ﬁrms are identical and earn identical proﬁts. If 0,t h e nn o n - m e m b e rﬁrms make
higher gross proﬁts than member ﬁrms as they enjoy a higher degree of diﬀerentiation (less intense
competition) in the product market than the member ﬁrms. Furthermore, taking the size of the
industry as given, non-member ﬁrms beneﬁt from a larger size of RJV as the diﬀerence in gross
proﬁts increases with .
Equilibrium degree of cooperation In the ﬁrst stage of the game, the members of the RJV
jointly set , so as to maximize their joint proﬁts, Π∗

¡

¢
. Since the RJV member ﬁrms are
symmetric, this program is equivalent to maximizing Π∗
().
Lemma 1 If ∗  0, an individual member of the RJV obtains a higher net proﬁt than a non-
member ﬁrm.
Proof. RJV member ﬁrms are always—at least weakly—better oﬀ by cooperating than by not
cooperating, as they can set the degree of cooperation  =0and receive the same equilibrium
proﬁts as the non-member ﬁrms. Therefore, if ∗  0,i tm u s tb et h a tΠ∗
  Π∗
−.
As we noted earlier, for a given degree of diﬀerentiation, non-member ﬁrms make higher gross
proﬁts than members of the RJV. However, in the equilibrium, the savings in product development
costs enjoyed by the RJV members can compensate for the loss in gross proﬁts (that is due to a
lower degree of diﬀerentiation among the member ﬁrms’ products).
In deciding on the degree of cooperation RJV member ﬁrms face the following trade-oﬀ.O nt h e
one hand, a higher degree of cooperation yields larger economies of development costs (development
cost eﬀect). On the other hand, it leads to ﬁercer competition through reduction in the degree of
diﬀerentiation between the member ﬁrms (competition eﬀect).
In order to study how ∗ varies with ,w eﬁrst determine the eﬀect of an increase in  on the
equilibrium gross proﬁts.
16See Appendix A1 for the derivation of equilibrium gross proﬁts.
8Lemma 2 Assume that 0. Then, the equilibrium gross proﬁts of the member ﬁrms are decreas-
ing with the size of the RJV for   2+1(1 − max) ≡ e  (and are increasing with it otherwise),
whereas the equilibrium gross proﬁts of the non-member ﬁrms are increasing with the size of the
RJV for all .
Proof. See Appendix A2.
The intuition behind Lemma 2 is as follows. When an additional ﬁrm participates in the RJV
(i.e., the size of the RJV increases from  to  +1 ), the demand for this ﬁrm and for the other
members shifts inward (as the degree of diﬀerentiation between this additional member of the RJV
and other  m e m b e r si sr e d u c e df r o mmax to ()), whereas the demand for non-member ﬁrms
remains unchanged.17 Therefore, an increase in the size of the RJV has a negative direct eﬀect on
proﬁt for the member ﬁrms and no direct eﬀect for the non-member ﬁrms. An increase in the size
of the RJV also has a positive strategic eﬀect on proﬁts. This is because as the demand for RJV
members shifts inward, each RJV member ﬁrm reduces its output, which implies a positive eﬀect
on other ﬁrms’ proﬁts.
To summarize, an increase in the size of the RJV implies only a positive strategic eﬀect for the
non-member ﬁrms, which explains why ∗
− is increasing with . For the members of the RJV, an
increase in the size of the RJV creates both a negative direct eﬀect and a positive strategic eﬀect
on gross proﬁts.
Proposition 1 The equilibrium degree of cooperation, ∗, varies non-monotonically with .
Proof. See Appendix B.
The relationship between the size of the RJV and the equilibrium degree of cooperation in
product development is non-monotonic due to the presence of three eﬀects that determine this
relationship:18
(i) Development cost eﬀect A higher number of member ﬁrms implies larger savings from
development costs, which gives member ﬁrms an incentive to cooperate more in product develop-
ment.
17This is because, by the construction of our model, the degree of diﬀerentiation between any given two non-member
ﬁr m si st h es a m ea st h ed e g r e eo fd i ﬀerentiation between a given member ﬁrm and a non-member ﬁrm. The result
presented in this Lemma hinges on this "symmetry" property.
18See also Appendix C, where we provide three special cases to illustrate how these three eﬀects interact and aﬀect
the equilibrium degree of cooperation.
9(ii) Negative direct eﬀect and positive strategic eﬀect As Lemma 2 shows, the proﬁt
of an RJV member is decreasing with  when  is small, and increasing with  otherwise, due
to the negative direct eﬀect and the positive strategic eﬀect. The RJV member ﬁrms set a low
degree of cooperation when the former eﬀect dominates the latter (and a high degree of cooperation
otherwise).
(iii) Sensitivity of proﬁts Al a r g e r makes gross proﬁts of the RJV member ﬁrms less
sensitive to diﬀerentiation when the degree of diﬀerentiation is low, which in turn gives member
ﬁrms an incentive to cooperate more in product development. To see why, consider the following
two extreme cases. If the degree of diﬀerentiation is near zero, a marginal increase in the degree
of diﬀerentiation yields a signiﬁcant increase in proﬁts when the number of member ﬁr m si ss m a l l ,
whereas its impact is negligible when the number of member ﬁrms is large (the number of ﬁrms has
a greater impact on proﬁts than the degree of product diﬀerentiation). On the other hand, if  → 1
(such that each ﬁrm serves an almost independent market), a marginal reduction in the degree of
diﬀerentiation has a small (resp., large) impact on proﬁts if the number of member ﬁr m si ss m a l l
(resp., large).
Proposition 2 The equilibrium degree of cooperation, ∗,i n c r e a s e sw i t h if (∗) ≤ e (max),
and decreases with  otherwise.
Proof. See Appendix D.
For a given size of RJV, a higher degree of cooperation implies a lower degree of diﬀerentiation
among the member ﬁrms’ products, which in turn intensiﬁes competition. A larger number of ﬁrms
in the industry makes proﬁts less sensitive to diﬀerentiation for low degrees of diﬀerentiation (and
more sensitive to diﬀerentiation for high degrees of diﬀerentiation). Therefore, when  is suﬃciently
low, a higher number of industry ﬁrms leads to a higher degree of cooperation.
Unfortunately, it is not possible to provide further analysis analytically, and hence, we specify
the functional forms and revert to numerical simulations.
Numerical Simulations
We specify the development cost and the degree of diﬀerentiation functions as follows:
()=

2
1,
10and
()=max − (max − min),
with   0. Note that both functions satisfy our modeling assumptions.
We consider the following ranges for the parameter values:  ∈ {45625};  ∈ {23};
 ∈ {1234};  ∈ {1234}; max ∈ {030409}; min ∈ {0001 max − 01};a n d
 ∈
©
0002042∗

¡
 =0  =1
¢ª
. For each value of the vector of parameters, we determine
∗ as the value of  which maximizes the RJV proﬁtf o r ∈ [01] and by steps of 001 for .
From Proposition 1, we know that ∗ () can take diﬀerent forms. In what follows, we use a
data set of simulations (of size 7,250,896) to estimate the relationship between ∗ and .19 To do
that, we run an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression, with ∗ as the dependent variable, and 
and the other model parameters as the explanatory variables. The results are reported in Table 1
in Appendix E1.
Although the equilibrium degree of cooperation, ∗, varies non-monotonically with ,o na v e r -
age, the degree of cooperation is decreasing with the (given) size of the RJV. That is, our simulations
show that, on average, RJVs with a large number of ﬁrms tend to cooperate on fewer product com-
ponents than those with fewer number of ﬁrms. The equilibrium degree of cooperation also, on
average, increases with the total number of ﬁrms in the industry as well as the development costs.
4 An RJV with an endogenous size and an exogenous scope
In this subsection, we consider an exogenously determined degree of cooperation, 0, and study
the equilibrium size of an RJV. In particular, wei n v e s t i g a t eh o wt h ee q u i l i b r i u ms i z eo ft h eR J V
varies with the degree of cooperation in product development.20
We deﬁne the equilibrium size of the RJV such that ∗ satisﬁes the following conditions: (i)
Π (∗) ≥ Π (∗ − 1);( i i )Π (∗) ≥ Π (∗ +1 );a n d( i i i )Π (∗) ≥ Π− (∗ − 1).21
The proﬁto fa nR J Vm e m b e rﬁrm is given by
Π∗
()=∗
 (()) −
∙
(1) −
 − 1

()
¸
 (3)
19The programs for the simulations were programmed in C, and are available upon request from the authors.
20This is the same approach adopted by Poyago-Theotoky (1995) and Falvey et al. (2006).
21One can think of cases where ﬁrst an RJV is formed, and then the member ﬁrms decide on the degree of
cooperation. Conditions (i) and (ii) state that all members of the RJV have no incentive to accept a ﬁrm as an
additional member or to exclude it, given that the equilibrium degree of cooperation will be determined by the size
of the RJV. Condition (iii) implies that none of the RJV members has an incentive to leave the RJV unilaterally.
11Proposition 3 Recall that e  ≡ 2+1(1 − max), which is deﬁned in Lemma 2, and assume that
an equilibrium exists. If e  , then the equilibrium size of the RJV is either (i) ,o r( i i )s m a l l e r
than e .
Proof. Let us assume for the moment that  is a real number, and not an integer. We have
Π∗
()

=
∗
 (())

+
()
2 .
The ﬁrst term is positive if e , and negative otherwise, and the second term is always positive.
Therefore, if there is an equilibrium, we either have a corner solution, i.e., ∗ = ,o r∗  e .
This result implies that if  is suﬃciently high so that e  ' 2, then the equilibrium RJV
involves either all ﬁrms (∗ = ) or less than half of the ﬁrms in the industry (∗   2). Another
consequence is that we can have multiple equilibria,22 one of which involves an industry-wide
RJV, and another, which involves an RJV with (approximately) less than half of the ﬁrms in the
industry.23
We now would like to study the variation of the equilibrium size of the RJV with the degree of
cooperation. Assume for the purpose of this analysis that  is a real number. Since the equilibrium
size of the RJV maximizes the joint proﬁts of the members (this corresponds to conditions (i) and
(ii) in the deﬁnition of the equilibrium), the equilibrium size solves the ﬁrst order condition,
∗
 (())

+
()
2 =0 .( 4 )
This ﬁrst order condition deﬁnes implicitly a function ∗ (). Given that the second order condition
holds, from the implicit function theorem, the variations of ∗ () with respect to  are given by
the variations of the two terms in (4) with respect to .S i n c e0 ()  0, the second term increases
with , which tends to increase ∗ (). The intuition is that a higher degree of cooperation implies
higher savings from development costs, which tends to increase the size of the RJV.
However, the ﬁrst term can either increase or decrease with ,a s


∙
∗
 (())

¸
=


∙
∗
 ()

¸
()

,
22Here, we mean in terms of the size of the RJV. Naturally, given an equilibrium size of the RJV, 
∗,a n dt h e
number of ﬁrms in the industry, ,t h e r ea r e

∗

equilibria.
23Note that, depending on the parameter values, there may be no equilibria as well.
12and  [∗
] can be either positive or negative (we always have ()0). Indeed,
intuitively, a lower  implies a higher magnitude both for the negative direct eﬀect and the positive
strategic eﬀect. Therefore, not surprisingly, a higher  c a nl e a de i t h e rt oah i g h e ro ral o w e r∗
.
This means that the eﬀect of  through the direct and the strategic eﬀects tends either to increase
or to decrease the size of the RJV.
The overall eﬀect of a higher  on the equilibrium size of the RJV, ∗, depends ultimately on
(·) and (·). Since we cannot establish an analytical result on the overall eﬀe c to ft h ed e g r e eo f
cooperation on the equilibrium size of the RJV with the general forms for (·) and (·),w en o w
specify them and revert to numerical simulations.
Numerical Simulations
We use the same functions for the development cost and the degree of diﬀerentiation as in the
previous section, and we run our simulations for the following ranges for parameter values:  ∈
{45625};  ∈ {1234};  ∈ {1234}; max ∈ {030409}; min ∈ {0001 max − 01};
 ∈ {0002042∗
 ( =0 =1 ) };a n d ∈ {000005010100}.F o r e a c h v a l u e o f
the vector of parameters, we determine ∗ as follows: (i) we ﬁrst determine the set of values of
 ∈ {23} that satisfy the three conditions of the equilibrium; and (ii) in cases with multiple
equilibria, we select the equilibrium which provides the RJV with the highest proﬁt.24
The OLS estimation results (with ∗ as the dependent variable, and with  =1 4 369280)
can be found in Table 2 in Appendix E2. Similar to the previous section, on average, there is a
negative relationship between the scope and the size of the RJV. A higher degree of cooperation,
on average, implies a lower equilibrium number of RJV member ﬁrms. Additionally, we ﬁnd that,
on average, higher development costs are associated with RJVs with a higher number of ﬁrms.
5 An RJV with an endogenous siz ea n da ne n d o g e n o u ss c o p e
In this subsection, we consider an RJV with an endogenous size and an endogenous degree of
cooperation.
Let e ∗ () = argmax

{Π ()},w h e r eΠ () i sg i v e nb y( 3 ) . W ed e ﬁne the equilibrium
such that {∗ ∗} satisfy the following conditions: (i) Π (∗ ∗) ≥ Π (∗ − 1 e ∗ (∗ − 1));( i i )
24We have 
∗ =1if no RJV is formed in equilibrium.
13Π (∗ ∗) ≥ Π (∗ +1  e ∗ (∗ +1 ) ) ; (iii) Π (∗ ∗) ≥ Π− (∗ − 1 e ∗ (∗ − 1));a n d( i v )∗ =
e ∗ (∗).
In what follows, we study the variation of ∗ and ∗ with the number of ﬁrms, .
First, consider the case where the degree of cooperation has an insigniﬁcant impact on product
diﬀerentiation (this is the case if min ' max). In this case, a higher degree of cooperation means
larger beneﬁts to the member ﬁrms (through cost-sharing), and hence, RJV members set the highest
degree of cooperation in product development, (i.e., ∗ =1 ). Furthermore, adding additional
members to the RJV has an insigniﬁcant negative eﬀect, while proﬁts further increase due to the
additional member that contributes to the development cost. Therefore, in equilibrium, there is an
industry-wide RJV (∗ = ),25 and full cooperation (∗ =1 ).
Second, consider that max  min. Since we cannot characterize the equilibria analytically for
this case, we revert to numerical simulations.
Numerical Simulations
We consider the same functional forms as in the previous simulations, and also the same range of
parameter values. Note that, diﬀerent from the previous section,  is now determined endogenously.
For each value of the vector of parameters, and for each  ∈ {12} we determine an ∗ ().
We proceed as follows: we determine the value of  which maximizes the RJV proﬁt, for  ∈ [01]
a n db ys t e p so f001 for . Then, in order to determine ∗,w e( i )ﬁrst determine the set of values of
 ∈ {23} that satisfy the three conditions of the equilibrium, and (ii) in cases with multiple
equilibria, we select the equilibrium which provides the RJV with the highest proﬁt.
Similar to the previous section, we use our simulated data, this time to estimate the relationship
between ∗ and ∗. The estimation results are reported in Table 3 and can be found in Appendix E3.
We ﬁnd a positive relationship between the equilibrium size of the RJV and the equilibrium degree
of cooperation. Also, on average, both the equilibrium size of the RJV and the equilibrium degree
of cooperation are increasing with the industry size. This implies that, on average, in industries
with a large number of ﬁrms, RJVs tend to include a large number of ﬁrms that cooperate on
a relatively large number of product components. Product development costs, on average, also
increase both the size and the scope of the RJV.
25Indeed, when  goes to 
−
max,w eﬁnd that


∗
 goes to ()
2, hence, 
∗
  0, which implies that 
∗ = .
146S o c i a l w e l f a r e
In this section, we compare how the size and the scope of the RJV compare to the social optima
in the three cases we have studied. We show that in all three cases, the equilibrium size and scope
of the RJV do not coincide with the social optimum. We also discuss the economic eﬀects that
explain this divergence.
Social welfare is deﬁned as the sum of industry proﬁt and consumer surplus. Hence, for a given
 and a given ,w eh a v e
 = Π ()+(  − )Π− ()+,
where Π (), Π− (),a n d can be found in Appendix F.
An RJV with an exogenous size and an endogenous scope In this case, to determine
whether ∗ is too low or too high compared to the social optimum, we compute


¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
=∗
=
¡
 − 
¢ Π−
¡

¢

¯
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
=∗
+


¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
=∗
.
We have


=




,
and we ﬁnd that   0.26 Therefore,   0, which means that the consumer surplus
is decreasing with the degree of cooperation. Therefore, from the consumers’ point of view, the
equilibrium degree of cooperation is too high. This is because consumers value variety and a
higher degree of cooperation reduces the degree of diﬀerentiation among the RJV member ﬁrms.
Under Cournot competition, the reduction in the prices (due to more intense competition) does
not compensate for the consumer’s utility loss from reduced diﬀerentiation.
Additionally, we have
Π−
¡

¢

=
Π−



,
and we ﬁnd that
Π−

=
−2
¡
 − 1
¢
( − )
2 (1 + max)(1− max)
¡
1+ + (max − )
¢
¡
(1 + )(( − 1)(1 − max)+2 )+(max − )
¡¡
 − 
¢
(1 − max)+2
¢¢3.
26The proof is done under Mathematica, and the mathematica ﬁle is available upon request from the authors.
15Since the numerator is negative and the denominator is positive, then Π−  0, and hence,
Π−
¡

¢
  0. T h a ti s ,t h en o n - m e m b e rﬁrms’ proﬁts are increasing with the degree of
cooperation. This is because a higher degree of cooperation implies a lower output produced by the
RJV member ﬁrms (as a reaction to the reduced degree of diﬀerentiation), which beneﬁts the non-
member ﬁrms. Therefore, the equilibrium degree of cooperation is too low from the non-members’
point of view. This also implies that it is too low from the industry point of view, unless all ﬁrms
are included in the RJV.
To summarize, whether ∗ is too low or too high compared to the social optimum is a priori
ambiguous.
We, therefore, ran our simulations for the same functional forms and parameter values mentioned
above. If  =  (industry-wide cooperation), we ﬁnd that the degree of cooperation is always too
high. This is in line with our analysis: with industry-wide cooperation, the degree of cooperation
is suboptimally high (resp., low) if it is too high (resp., low) from the consumer viewpoint. Since
consumer surplus is decreasing with the degree of cooperation, then the equilibrium degree of
cooperation is always too high from a social welfare perspective.
If  ,w eﬁnd that ∗ can be either too low or too high compared to the social optimum, .
We conducted a probit estimation on the probability that ∗  . The estimation results show
that ∗ is more likely to be too high when  is high and  is high, that is, for large industries and
RJVs of a large relative size. It might be more relevant to study the absolute diﬀerence between
∗ and  to determine whether the equilibrium is "far" from the social optimum. We, therefore,
regressed |∗ − | with respect to , , and our other simulation parameters. The results show
that the equilibrium is farther from the social optimum when  is higher and  is lower.
An RJV with an endogenous size and an exogenous scope In this case, in order to
determine how ∗ compares with the social optimum, we assume that  is a real number, and
compute the following:


¯
¯ ¯ ¯
=∗
=(  − )
Π− ()

¯
¯ ¯ ¯
=∗
+


¯
¯ ¯ ¯
=∗
.
From Lemma 2, we know that Π− ()  0. That is, from the non-member RJV ﬁrms’
point of view, the equilibrium size of the RJV is too small. This also implies that the size of the
RJV that maximizes the industry proﬁts is necessarily larger than the equilibrium size (since ∗
maximizes the RJV member ﬁrms’ proﬁts), unless all ﬁrms are included in the RJV. This is because
16when a non-member ﬁrm joins the RJV, it—as well as other member ﬁrms—contracts output (due
to the reduced degree of diﬀerentiation), which beneﬁts the remaining non-member ﬁrms in the
industry.
We also ﬁnd that   0,27 which means that consumers would be better oﬀ with a smaller
size RJV. This is because, consumers value variety, and the degree of diﬀerentiation among the RJV
members is less than the degree of diﬀerentiation among non-member ﬁr m s( w h i c hi st h es a m ea s
the degree of diﬀerentiation between any member ﬁrm and any non-member ﬁrm).
As a result, how ∗ compares to the social optimum is a priori ambiguous.
We ran our simulations for the same functional forms and parameter values mentioned above.
We ﬁnd that the equilibrium size of the RJV can be either too high or too low. We deﬁne a dummy
variable that takes value 1 if ∗  , and value 0 otherwise. We then estimate a probit model with
this dummy variable as the dependent variable and our model parameters as explanatory variables.
We ﬁnd that the size of the RJV is more likely to be too high from a welfare point of view if (i) 
is high, and (ii)  is high. Finally, we regressed (with an OLS regression) |∗ − | on our model
parameters. We ﬁnd that the equilibrium is farther from the social optimum when (i)  is high,
and (ii)  is high.
An RJV with an endogenous size and an endogenous scope We ﬁnd that the equilibrium
size and scope of the RJV can be too high or too low from a social welfare point of view. To
determine the market conditions under which the equilibrium is the "farthest" from the social
optimum, we regressed |∗ − | and |∗ − | on our model parameters, where  and  are
the socially optimum size of the RJV and scope of the RJV, respectively. We ﬁnd that, ceteris
paribus, |∗ − | and |∗ − | are higher (that is, the size and scope of the RJV are farther from
the social optimum) when (i) the industry size () is larger, (ii) the development cost ()i sh i g h e r ,
and (iii) min is higher and max is lower.
An interesting question is also whether the RJV also has too wide of a scope when the RJV
is too large (for instance). To answer this equation, we regressed |∗ − | on |∗ − | and on
our other model parameters. We ﬁnd a positive a signiﬁcant relationship between |∗ − | on
|∗ − |, that is, when an RJV is too large in size from a welfare point of view, it also tends to
have too large a scope.
27The proof is done under Mathematica, and the mathematica ﬁle is available upon request from the authors.
177C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper, we have provided a model of RJV in product development in an oligopolistic setting
to study the size and the scope of RJV.
The relationship between the size and the scope of an RJV proves to be rather complex. Even
for the cases where either the size or the scope of an RJV is given, the relationship between the
two can be non-monotonic. However, our numerical simulations reveal that, on average, there is
a negative relationship between the two when either one is exogenously determined. When both
t h es i z ea n dt h es c o p eo ft h eR J Va r ee n d o g e n o u s ,w eﬁnd that, on average, there is a positive
relationship between the equilibrium size and the equilibrium scope. Furthermore, both the size
and the scope of an RJV tend to increase with the industry size.
In our attempt to describe the relationship between the size of an RJV and the degree of
cooperation in product development, we adopted the simplest setting possible. In particular, we
considered a single RJV within an industry. We also ignored any uncertainty or spillovers that the
product development process may involve. These are possible areas for possible extensions.
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A1. Equilibrium proﬁts
The proﬁto fﬁrm  =1is equal to  =(  − ).E a c hﬁrm chooses its quantity, ,s oa st o
maximize its proﬁt. The ﬁrst-order condition for proﬁt maximization is
 −  + 


=  −  −  =0 
that is  −  = . We search for a symmetric equilibrium, such that in equilibrium 1 =  = 
for member ﬁrms and +1 =  =  for non-member ﬁrms. Using the ﬁrst-order conditions and
the symmetry conditions, we ﬁnd:
∗
 =( ∗
)
2 =
(1 + max)
2 ( − )
2
((1 + )(( − 1)(1 − max)+2 )+(max − )(( − )(1− max)+2 ) )
2
for the RJV member ﬁrms; and
∗
− =
¡
∗
−
¢2 =
(1 +  + (max − ))
2 ( − )
2
((1 + )(( − 1)(1 − max)+2 )+(max − )(( − )(1− max)+2 ) )
2
for the non-member ﬁrms.
A2. Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. For the ﬁrst part of the Lemma, notice that the numerator of ∗
 does not depend on ,
and the denominator is increasing with  if 2+
¡
2 − 
¢
(1 − max)  0,t h a ti s ,i fe .F o rt h e
second part of the Lemma, note that we have ∗
− increasing with  as
∗
−

=
2(max − )(1− max)( − )
2 ¡
1+ +( max − )
¢h

2
(max − )+( 1+)
¡
2 − 1
¢i
¡
(1 + )(( − 1)(1 − max)+2 )+(max − )
¡¡
 − 
¢
(1 − max)+2
¢¢3  0,
since both the both numerator and denominator are positive.
B. Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. The equilibrium degree of cooperation, ∗,s a t i s ﬁes the following ﬁrst-order condition
21∗




+
 − 1



=0  (A1)
This condition deﬁnes implicitly a function ∗ ¡

¢
. Assuming that the second-order holds strictly,
by the implicit function theorem, the variations of ∗ ¡

¢
are given by the variations of the left-hand
of (A1) with respect to .F i r s t ,w eh a v e
 − 1



increasing with . This is the development cost eﬀect; a higher  implies higher savings from
development costs, which tends to increase the degree of cooperation. Second, we have


∗


=
2( − )
2 (1 + max)
2 £
(1 − max)
¡
 − 2
¢
+2
¤

¡
max
¢
¡
(1 + )(( − 1)(1 − max)+2 )+(max − )
¡¡
 − 
¢
(1 − max)+2
¢¢4 (A2)
where
 =2( 1− max)(max − )
2
− 2(2+(1− max))(max − ) + 
and
 =( 1+3 max − 2)(1+max + (1 − max))  0.
 is a second-degree polynomial in . Assume that  =0has two solutions, 1 and 2.W e
know that 12 has the sign of 2(1− max)(max − ), hence, it is positive. Therefore, if  has
two roots, either they are both negative or both positive. It follows that either  is always positive
or  is ﬁrst positive, then negative, then positive. If  i sp o s i t i v e ,t h e n( A 2 )h a st h es i g no f
(1 − max)
¡
 − 2
¢
+2 ,w h e r e a s ,i f is negative, then (A2) has the opposite sign. It follows that
the equilibrium degree of cooperation varies non-monotonically with .
C. The relationship between ∗ and 
We provide three special cases to illustrate how the three eﬀects that determine the relationship
between ∗ and .
Case 1.  =0 . In this case, only the positive development cost eﬀect is at work.
Therefore, ﬁrms choose ∗ =1(full cooperation), for any .
Case 2.  approaches −
max.I n t h i s c a s e , w e ﬁnd that  (∗
) has the sign of 2+
(1 − max)
¡
 − 2
¢
. This is because the sensitivity of the proﬁts eﬀect is always positive, and the
22sign of the competition eﬀect depends on whether the negative direct eﬀect or the positive strategic
eﬀect dominates. Consequently, the competition eﬀect is negative (giving incentives to reduce ∗)
when e , and positive otherwise. It follows that when e ,w eh a v e∗ decreasing with 
if the negative competition eﬀect dominates the positive development cost eﬀect, and increasing
otherwise. When  ≥ e ,b o t he ﬀects move in the same direction and ∗ is increasing with .
Case 3. max =1 . In this case, the RJV proﬁte ﬀect is always positive (i.e., ∗
 is decreasing
with  for all ). Therefore, the sign of the competition eﬀect is given by the sign of the sensitivity
of proﬁts eﬀect; it is positive if (2 − )(1 − ), and negative otherwise. Therefore, if this
inequality holds, the competition eﬀect is negative (which tends to reduce ∗), whereas the devel-
opment cost eﬀect is positive (which tends to increase ∗). Otherwise, (i.e., (2 − )(1 − ))
∗ is increasing with .
D .P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2
Proof. L e tu sa s s u m et h a t∗ is an interior solution. If this is the case, then ∗ satisﬁes the
ﬁrst-order condition
Π

−


=0 .
Given that the second-order condition holds, the variation of ∗ with respect to  are given by the
variation of the left side of the FOC. Since  does not depend on , then the variation of
∗ with respect to  is given by the variation of Π with respect to .W eh a v e
Π

=
Π



.
We compute


∙
Π

¸
=

4,
where  =2(  − )
2 ¡
 − 1
¢
(1 − max)(1+max)
2  has the sign of .W eﬁnd that  ≥ 0 if and
only if  ≥ e (max),w i t h
e (max)=
2+2  − 3 − 2
³

2
− 1+ − (2 + )
´
max + (3 + 2 − 2)2
max
2( − 1)(1 + max +
¡
 − 
¢
(1 − max))
.
Therefore, if  ≤ e (max) then  ≤ 0, hence, Π decreases with , and therefore, ∗ increases
with  (since   0).
23Notice that a necessary condition for  ≥ e (max) to happen is e (max)  max;t h a ti s ,w eh a v e
e (max)=max i fa n do n l yi f
max =1−
4
2+3  − 2
.
E. Estimation Results
E1. Regression of ∗
Column (1) gives the estimation results of an OLS regression of ∗ on  and the other model
parameters. Column (2) adds a quadratic term for  as a robustness check.
Table 1
(1) (2)
∗ ∗
 −00069 (000001) −00204 (000004)

2
00006 (000000)
 00053 (000001) 00052 (000001)
min 03856 (000025) 03856 (000025)
max −07230 (000047) −07152 (000047)
 00166 (000001) 00163 (000001)
 −00325 (000005) −00325 (000005)
 00778 (000005) 00778 (000005)
constant 04384 (000038) 04867 (000040)
2 05248 05325
 7250896 7250896
Standard errors in parentheses.
All coeﬃcients are statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
E2. Regression of ∗
Column (1) gives the estimation results of an OLS regression of ∗ on  and the other model
parameters. Column (2) adds a quadratic term for  as a robustness check.
24Table 2
(1) (2)
∗ ∗
 −61731 (000323) −45994 (001235)
2 −16565 (001255)
 02303 (000018) 02303 (000018)
min 37084 (000412) 37084 (000412)
max −62249 (000723) −62249 (000722)
 01132 (000016) 01132 (000016)
 03146 (000083) 03146 (000083)
 13192 (000083) 13192 (000083)
constant 29581 (000587) 27220 (000613)
2 03793 03801
 14369280 14369280
Standard errors in parentheses.
All coeﬃcients are statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
E3. Regression of ∗ and ∗
Column (1) gives the estimation results of an OLS regression of ∗ on the model parameters.
Column (2) gives the estimation results of a regression with ∗ as the dependent variable. Finally,
column (3) regresses ∗ on ∗ and the other model parameters.
25Table 3
(1) (2) (3)
∗ ∗ ∗
∗ 06035 (002628)
 07460 (000384) 00116 (000017) 07390 (000385)
2 −00117 (000014) −00002 (000006) −00116 (000014)
 00007 (000079) 00162 (000004) −00090 (000089)
min 03113 (002053) 04613 (000092) 00329 (002384)
max −06644 (003633) −07592 (000163) −02061 (004144)
 20234 (000415) 00549 (000019) 19902 (000439)
 18750 (000415) −00597 (000019) 19111 (000443)
constant −84385 (003293) 04918 (000148) −87353 (003537)
2 05172 04879 05176
 718464 718464 718464
Standard errors in parentheses.
All coeﬃcients are statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level, except the coeﬃcients
for  (column 1), and min (column 3), which are not signiﬁcant.
F. Social Welfare
We begin with the derivation of the consumer surplus. The utility of the representative consumer
is given by
 (q)=
 X
=1
 −
1
2
 X
=1
()
2 −
−1 X
=1

 X
=+1
(1 − ) + ,( A 3 )
where  is the degree of diﬀerentiation between the product of ﬁrm  and the product of ﬁrm .
Let
 =
−1 X
=1

 X
=+1
(1 − ).
26Since the ﬁrst  ﬁrms are RJV members and the next − ﬁrms are non members, one can develop
 as follows:
 =
 X
=1

⎛
⎝
 X
=+1
(1 − ) +
 X
=+1
(1 − )
⎞
⎠ +
−1 X
=+1

 X
=+1
(1 − ),
=
 X
=1

 X
=+1
(1 − ) +
 X
=1

 X
=+1
(1 − ) +
−1 X
=+1

 X
=+1
(1 − ).
The ﬁrst term of  can be rewritten as
 X
=1

 X
=+1
(1 − ) =( 1− )()
2 ( − 1)
2
,
the second term as
 X
=1

 X
=+1
(1 − ) =( 1− )− ( − ),
and ﬁn a l l yt h et h i r dt e r ma s
−1 X
=+1

 X
=+1
(1 − ) =( 1− )(−)
2 ( − )( −  − 1)
2
.
Summing up,  can be rewritten as follows:
 =( 1− )()
2 ( − 1)
2
+( 1− )− ( − ) +( 1− )(−)
2 ( − )( −  − 1)
2
.
Now, we compute the total price paid by the representative consumer,
 X
=1
 =
 X
=1

⎛
⎝ −  −
X
6=
(1 − )
⎞
⎠
= 
 X
=1
 −
 X
=1
()
2 −
 X
=1

X
6=
(1 − ).
Notice that, by symmetry, we have
 X
=1

X
6=
(1 − ) =2
−1 X
=1

X
=+1
(1 − ) =2 .
27Therefore, the consumer surplus can be written as
 =  (q) −
 X
=1
 =
1
2
 X
=1
()
2 +  + .( A 4 )
Replacing the expression of  in (A4), we ﬁnd that
 =
1
2
£
( +  − )2
 +[  −  +( 1− )( − )( −  − 1)]2
− +2 ( − )(1− )−
¤
+.
Net proﬁt of member and non-member ﬁrms are
Π∗
()=∗
 (()) −
∙
(1) −
 − 1

()
¸

Π∗
−()=∗
− (()) − (1)
where ∗
 and ∗
− are deﬁned in Appendix A1. Therefore, the industry proﬁts are
= ∗
 (()) − 
∙
(1) −
 − 1

()
¸
+(  − )
¡
∗
− (()) − (1)
¢

28